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Abstract
We model agents who use self-deception to rationalize and justify
actions that can eventually lead them into temptation. Formally, we
extend Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) framework to three time periods
and obtain a special functional form for the temptation utility at the
interim stage. Our representation portrays an agent who is tempted
(i) to relax her normative attitude towards future indulgence and (ii)
to turn a blind eye to any possibility of temptation altogether. Welfare
implications of self-deception are discussed.
1 Introduction
\This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half the
disorders of human life."
{ Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
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1The seminal model of Gul and Pesendorfer [13] (henceforth GP) captures
temptation in the form of desires that appear to the agent at the moment
of choice and demand their satisfaction. This paper promotes an alternative
view where tempting desires can employ more strategic and more sophisti-
cated means to achieve their eventual satisfaction. We hold that agents can,
in a state of self-deception, ¯nd ways of rationalizing actions that will even-
tually lead them into temptation. Desires can steer the agent through her
reasoning.
The strategic nature of temptation is recognized in psychology. It studies
not only the strategies that people use to resist temptation, but also the
strategies they use to allow their resolve to fail. Baumeister, Heatherton,
and Tice [3, p. 139] write:
Smokers face the choice of obtaining immediate grati¯cation
of their addiction or living for a longer period of time. To do this,
smokers must ignore or rationalize the long-term consequences of
smoking. Thus, for instance, they claim that the evidence is weak
linking smoking to cancer, or they fall prey to thoughts that they
are personally invulnerable..
Similarly, individuals who may need to lose weight for health
reasons often ¯nd themselves in tempting situations...Such in-
dividuals are known to engage in irrational thought processes
during such events (\Well, one cookie won't harm me,"..). Thus,
giving in to temptation also involves a number of cognitive strate-
gies that are used to negate the perceived long-term consequences
associated with indulgence.
Therefore, desires that directly impact the agent at the moment of choice
may also a®ect the agent in the steps leading up to it by motivating her
to construct rationalizations for behaviors she hitherto preferred to avoid.
These rationalizations enable the agent to justify a course of action that
eventually leads her into temptation by diminishing the negative content of
the action, often emphasizing that the agent does not perceive or comprehend
the `badness' of her action.
Rationalizations are a necessary feature of self-deception, but also belongs
to the related phenomenon of motivated reasoning (Kunda [18]).1 The key
1Kunda [18, pg 482] proposes that people who are \motivated to arrive at a particular
2de¯ning feature of self-deception is that rationalizations are accompanied
with internal tension. Losonsky [20] writes:
[S]elf-deceivers who come to recognize that they were self-
deceivers often report that although they had rejected the belief,
say, that they were anorexic (or that their children were using
drugs), \on another level I knew I was anorexic," or, \I knew
all along she was abusing drugs, but I refused to accept it."...
Self-deception involves some kind of recognition of the fact that
the available evidence warrants the undesirable proposition more
than the desirable one. This can be manifested in various ways.
One way is in a recurring or nagging doubt that typically does
not occur when subjects ¯x their beliefs. Similarly, self-deceivers
can ¯nd themselves repeatedly and obsessively entertaining the
undesirable proposition and going over the same line of reasoning
that supports the desirable proposition.
Thus, self-deception involves a delicate balance between the agent's at-
tempt to deceive herself and a minimal degree of awareness of this. This
manifests itself in the internal tension that accompanies self-deception and is
absent in simple motivated reasoning. Self-deception cannot survive knowl-
edge of self-deception, but it co-exists with suspicion of self-deception.
This paper builds a choice-theoretic model of what we refer to as temptation-
driven self-deception.2 We seek to behaviorally capture the phenomenon as
described above, but also to distinguish it from overt temptation and moti-
vated reasoning. Our model is built in a GP-style setup. Choices are made
in three stages|ex ante, interim, and ex post. Consumption takes place only
in the ex post stage, where the agent faces a menu to choose out of. This
conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justi¯cation of their desired conclusion
that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if
they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it".
2In the psychology literature, self-deception has also been discussed in the context of
achieving long term goals or the need to adjust and function in a social environment.
This accommodates the case of positive illusions (Taylor [29], Taylor and Brown [30]) that
take the form of self-aggrandizing self-perceptions, exaggerated perception of control over
surroundings and unrealistic optimism, which are viewed as serving an important adaptive
function. We also mention that wishful thinking is related but distinct from self-deception
because the latter survives in the `teeth of evidence' (by explaining away or reinterpreting
the evidence) while the former does not (Szabados [26]).
3menu is itself chosen in the interim stage, and the menu of menus available
to her in this stage is determined in the ex ante stage. Temptation acts
directly and overtly on the agent in the ex post stage, and it acts on her in-
directly via self-deception in the interim stage. Our primitive is the agent's
preferences over menus of menus in the ex ante stage, which is assumed to
be prior to the experience of any temptation or self-deception. At this stage,
the agent is in a cold emotional state that allows her to have an adequate
picture of her future choices and struggle with temptation.3 To illustrate the
setting, imagine an agent who is tempted to drink heavily when it is feasible.
Whenever she visits a neighborhood consisting of bars and restaurants, she
rationalizes her way into bars. Recognising that she somehow ends up in
bars whenever one is in the neighborhood, she selects what neighborhood to
visit accordingly. Here, ¯nal consumption is alcohol consumption, bars and
restaurants are menus, and a neighborhood is a menu or menus.
We adopt the natural counterparts of GP's conditions and highlight that,
when appropriately reinterpreted, they provide a setting where self-deception
can be studied. In particular, the notion of self-control in GP's model permits
reinterpretation in terms of the existence of internal tension at the interim
stage: the agent rationalizes a (desirable) ranking of menus in the interim
stage but yet is never completely divorced from her ex ante perspective. In-
tuitively, nagging doubts about the soundness of one's reasoning may restrict
the extent to which one follows it. Imagine, for instance, a cancer patient
who honestly avows the belief that she will not die of cancer, but never ¯nds
herself committing to any serious long term plans either. This is where the
model is not explicable in terms of motivated thinking.
Within this GP style framework, we introduce two novel axioms that
express self-deception and separate our model from one of overt temptation
by menus. The axioms express the idea that self-deception is motivated and
restricted: (i) it arises only if it ultimately leads to a greater satisfaction
of ex post desires, and (ii) only those rationalizations can be adopted that
mask her inferior motives behind a suitable facade of interim rationality.
The corresponding representation for preference is obtained in Theorem 2.
This representation portrays an agent who is tempted to relax her ex ante
normative perspective at the interim stage in the direction of anticipated ex
3Empirical foundations for such a `special period 0' perspective are provided in Noor
[23] on the basis of the hypothesis that distant temptations have smaller impact on current
choices than do immediate temptations. Thus, our ex ante stage may be interpreted as a
time su±ciently distant from the interim stage.
4post desires, and possibly also turn a blind eye to future temptations. Thus,
rationalizations arise subjectively in this paper, as part of the representation
for our axioms.
Our more general result (Theorem 3) goes beyond temptation-driven
self-deception and incorporates an unconditionally-exaggerated view of self-
control ability. This extension has interesting welfare implications. For in-
stance, it implies that welfare can decrease if menus containing temptation
(`vice' menus) are mixed with menus containing normatively attractive alter-
natives (`virtuous' menus). This is re°ected in the following preference over
menus of menus:
fa;bg Â fa;a [ bg;
where a is a virtuous menu and b a vice menu. Intuitively, larger menus lend
themselves to more excuses. Thus, it can be easier for the agent to deceive
herself into choosing a [ b from fa;a [ bg than into choosing b from fa;bg.
This provides a rationale for separating vice and virtue, which is presumably
the main purpose of alcohol beverage consumption (ABC) laws or zoning
laws for casinos.
1.1 Related Literature
There is an active philosophical debate about self-deception. The traditional
intentionalists understand self-deception in light of interpersonal deception,
thus requiring the self-deceiver to believe p but intentionally bring about the
belief :p (Sartre [25], Fingarette [12]). The di±culties raised by implied
paradoxes has led more recent intentionalists to weaken the requirement of
holding contradictory beliefs to just intentionally bringing about a belief {
motivated by some desire or emotion { despite an initial recognition that the
evidence may not warrant this belief (Talbott [28], Bermudez [5]). Levy [19]
suggests that the agent can \avoid the evidence, or situations in which he is
likely to be confronted by the evidence, can rationalize the evidence he has
by imagining unlikely but possible explanations for each piece, and so on"
and Talbott [28] suggests that the agent can exercise selectivity in attention,
memory, evidence-gathering and reasoning. In this view, intentionality is not
abandoned, and it remains prere°ective.4 Non-intentionalists allow that such
4It is argued that intentionality underlies the internal tension typically identi¯ed with
self-deception, which may be revealed in opacity and indirection (Levy [19]), emotional
resistance to evidence (Talbott [28]) or hypersensitivity to criticism, confrontation or op-
5forms of self-deception may be possible, but emphasize that most cases of self-
deception can be also be explained in terms of unintentional motivationally-
biased information processing, without resorting to unconscious beliefs and
intentions (Barnes [2], Mele [21]). These various theories are not clearly
distinguishable behaviorally in general, but in our setting the presence or
absence of internal tension can be distinguished behaviorally.
To our knowledge, the idea of temptation-driven self-deception that we
consider has not been studied in economics. The behavioral economics liter-
ature discusses positive illusions (Benabou and Tirole [4]) and wishful think-
ing (Brunnermeier and Parker [6]). The internal tension that de¯nes self-
deception is absent in these models { the agent simply responds to a moti-
vation to distort beliefs in a particular manner. The decision-theoretic lit-
erature on temptation has modelled temptation only as arising in its naked,
unstrategic form and being relevant mainly at the moment of choice. One
paper that comes close to ours is Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [7],
who provide a decision-theoretic model of an agent who follows her prefer-
ences only to the extent that she can justify it. The primitive of their model
is a choice function and the representation suggests that the agent has a
preference over alternatives and a set of rationales (binary relations) that
she uses to ascertain choice: for any given menu, she ¯rst determines the
maximizer of each rationale, and then her choice follows the rationale whose
maximizer is most preferred. While this may serve as a model of motivated
reasoning, it does not serve as a model of self-deception because the choice
domain (choice from menus) is not rich enough to express the existence of any
internal tension. Indeed, the authors show that their model either subsumes
or is observationally equivalent to others that involve substantially di®erent
stories.
The idea that an agent may be tempted to change her view of world
(speci¯cally, beliefs over a state space) is considered in Epstein [10] and Ep-
stein and Kopylov [11]. The temptation to change beliefs is unexplained, and
in particular, its existence is not motivated in the sense of serving a strategic
function. In our paper, a temptation to change the ex ante perspective (about
her propensity for self-control, etc) serves the purpose of, and owes its exis-
tence to, the desire for tempting ¯nal consumption. There is no temptation
by ¯nal consumption in Epstein [10] and Epstein and Kopylov [11].
The idea that temptation may in°uence the choice of menu is present in
posing evidence (Gur and Sackeim [14]).
6Noor [22, 23] and Noor and Ren [24], but the mode in which temptation acts
there is presumed to be direct and overt. Our paper maintains that an agent
may be tempted by menus, but it hypothesizes that the agent is only tempted
by menus that she can justify choosing. Indeed, we ¯nd that the models of
tempting menus in [22, 24] cannot be regarded as one of self-deception.
A version of our self-deception model also shows up in Noor [23]. There
are two important di®erences, however. First, the model appears in [23]
mainly as a means to axiomatically unify other temptation models in the
literature. In contrast, the current paper starts by behaviorally de¯ning a
necessary condition for self-deception, and it turns out that the representa-
tion theorem delivers the same model. A novel interpretation of that model
is obtained here as a result. Second, our choice domain di®ers substantially
from [23] and so do our axioms. Intuitively, our axioms are imposed on the
agent's perspective in a cold state { in a special period 0 { where she antici-
pates all temptation (by self-deception or otherwise) but is not subject to it
yet. In contrast, axioms in [23] are imposed directly on choice in a hot state,
when the agent is subject to all kinds of temptation. A counterpart of our
main axiom does not appear in [23].
On a technical level our results exploit Kopylov's [15, 17] extensions of
GP's model to dynamic settings with more than two periods and to repre-
sentations with ¯nitely many additive components.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The introduction con-
cludes with a mention of related literature. Section 2 introduces the prim-
itives of the model and presents a benchmark case. Section 3 presents our
model of self-deception. Section 4 extends this model to permit a virtuous
self-perception and derives some of its implications for welfare policy. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to appendices.
2 Preliminaries
To aid exposition in subsequent sections, we ¯rst present a basic three-period
extension of GP's model.
Let X = fx;y;z;:::g be the set ¢(Z) of all Borel probability measures
on a compact metric space Z of deterministic consumptions. Let d be the
Prohorov metric of the weak convergence topology on X. More generally, let
X be the class of all Anscombe{Aumann acts f that map a ¯nite state space
7­ into ¢(Z), and let d be the corresponding product metric in X.5
Suppose that choices are made in three stages|ex ante, interim, and ex
post|and these choices determine the decision maker's consumption in X
after the ex post stage. Let M1 = fa;b;c;:::g be the set of all interim
menus|non-empty compact subsets a ½ X. Interpret any menu a 2 M1
as a course of action that, if taken at the interim stage, restricts the ex post
choice to the set a ½ X. Endow the space M1 with the Hausdor® metric ¹1
and de¯ne mixtures
®a + (1 ¡ ®)b = f®x + (1 ¡ ®)y : x 2 a; y 2 bg
for all ® 2 [0;1] and menus a;b 2 M1.
Similarly, let M0 = fA;B;C;:::g be the set of all ex ante menus|non-
empty compact subsets A ½ M1. Interpret any menu A 2 M0 as a course of
action that, if taken ex ante, restricts the interim choice to the set A ½ M1.
Endow the space M0 with the Hausdor® metric ¹0 and de¯ne mixtures
®A + (1 ¡ ®)B = f®a + (1 ¡ ®)b : a 2 A; b 2 Bg
for all ® 2 [0;1] and menus A;B 2 M0. Then both M0 and M1 are compact
(see Theorem 3.71 in Aliprantis and Border [1]) and the mixture operations
in these spaces are continuous.
Let a binary relation º on M0 be the decision maker's weak preference
over ex ante menus. Write the symmetric and asymmetric parts of this
relation as » and Â respectively. Note that our model does not take the
decision maker's interim and ex post choices as primitive, but instead derives
her anticipation of these choices from her ex ante preference.
Adapt GP's list of axioms for the preference º.
Axiom 1 (Order). º is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all menus A 2 M0, the sets fB 2 M0 : B º
Ag and fB 2 M0 : B ¹ Ag are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all ® 2 [0;1] and menus A;B;C 2 M0,
A º B ) ®A + (1 ¡ ®)C º ®B + (1 ¡ ®)C:
5Menus of lotteries are ¯rst used by Gul and Pesendorfer [13] and|for ¯nite Z|by
Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini [8]. Menus of acts are proposed by Epstein [10].
8Axiom 4 (Set-Betweenness). For all menus a;b 2 M1 and A;B 2 M0,
fag º fbg ) fag º fa [ bg º fbg; (1)
A º B ) A º A [ B º B: (2)
Order and Continuity are standard conditions of rationality. To motivate
Independence, interpret any mixture ®A + (1 ¡ ®)C as a lottery that yields
the menus A and C with probabilities ® and 1¡® respectively and is resolved
after the ex post stage. In this interpretation, the decision maker's interim
choice ®a+(1¡®)c in ®A+(1¡®)C and her ex post choice ®x+(1¡®)y
in ®a + (1 ¡ ®)c determine her consumptions x 2 a 2 A and y 2 c 2 C
contingent on the resolution of the lottery between the menus A and C. If
the timing of the resolution of this objective uncertainty is irrelevant for
preference, then the decision maker should be indi®erent between the menu
®A + (1 ¡ ®)C and a hypothetical lottery ® ± A + (1 ¡ ®) ± C that yields
the menus A or C with probabilities ® and 1¡® respectively, but is resolved
immediately after the ex ante stage. (Here the preference º is extended
from the original domain M0 to lotteries over menus.) Then the standard
separability argument suggests that
A º B ) ® ± A + (1 ¡ ®) ± C º ® ± B + (1 ¡ ®) ± C
because the possibility of getting the menu C with probability 1 ¡ ® should
not a®ect the decision maker's comparison of A and B. Independence follows.
Set-Betweenness is imposed separately on the preference º over the entire
M0 and on the restriction of º to singleton menus fag that provide a strict
commitment to the menu a 2 M1 at the interim stage, but may still require
self-control ex post when choice in a has to be made. It is assumed that the
decision maker's ex ante evaluation of any such menu fag is based on her
anticipation of two factors:
² the consumption xa 2 a that she will choose if a is feasible ex post,
² the self-control that she will use to resist the strongest temptation
ya 2 a in this menu.
This informal assumption suggests that for all menus a;b 2 M1,
xb 2 a; ya 2 b ) fag º fbg: (3)
9Indeed, if xb 2 a and ya 2 b, then the decision maker should expect that
if she chooses xa from the menu a at the ex post stage, then she will (i)
obtain the same consumption that she plans to choose from b and (ii) resist
the temptation ya, which belongs to b and hence, should not be harder to
resist than the strongest temptation yb in b. Therefore, the ranking fag º
fbg is intuitive because the menu a o®ers a weakly better combination of
consumption bene¯ts and self-control costs than b does. Condition (3) implies
(1).6 Analogously, condition (2) assumes that the decision maker should
evaluate any menu A 2 M0 based on her anticipated interim choice aA 2
A and the most tempting alternative bA 2 A in this menu. Note that if
temptations are cumulative or uncertain (as in Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini
[9]), then both parts of Set-Betweenness can be violated.
The following condition is used to obtain uniqueness in representation
results below.
Axiom 5 (Regularity). There are x;y;x0;y0 2 X such that






The two rankings in this axiom are intuitive if the agent plans to resist
the tempting consumption y in the menu fx;yg at the ex post stage, and to
resist the tempting menu fy0g in ffx0g;fy0gg at the interim stage.
Say that a function u : X ! R is linear if for all ® 2 [0;1] and x;y 2 X,
u(®x + (1 ¡ ®)y) = ®u(x) + (1 ¡ ®)u(y):
Let U be the set of all continuous linear functions u : X ! R. Similarly,
de¯ne linearity for functions on M1 and let U1 be the set of all continuous
linear functions V : M1 ! R.
Theorem 1. The preference º satis¯es Axioms 1{4 if and only if º is













(v(y) ¡ v(x))]; (5)
6To show this claim, take any menus fag º fbg. Let c = a [ b. Then xa;xb;ya;yb 2 c.
By (3), if xc 2 a, then fag º fcg; if xc 2 b, then fbg º fcg. In either case, fag º fcg. By
(3), if yc 2 a, then fcg º fag; if yc 2 b, then fcg º fbg. In either case, fcg º fbg.
10where u;v 2 U and V 2 U1.
Moreover, if º satis¯es Regularity, then it has another representation
(4) with components u0;v0 2 U and V 0 2 U1 if and only if u0 = ®u + ¯u,
v0 = ®v + ¯v, and V 0 = ®V + ¯V for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v;¯V 2 R.
This theorem provides a joint characterization for GP's utility represen-
tations (4) and (5) over M0 and M1 respectively. The restriction of U to
M1 can be interpreted as the decision maker's ex ante normative perspec-
tive on what menu should be chosen at the interim stage. Temptations that
impact her at this stage are captured by V , and the nonnegative component
maxb2A(V (b)¡V (a)) is interpreted as the self-control cost of choosing a from
A. Similarly, the function u can be interpreted as the ex ante normative per-
spective on what should be chosen at the ex post stage, and the nonnegative
term maxy2a(v(y) ¡ v(x)) as the mental cost of ex post self-control. These
interpretations suggest that in order to balance her normative perspective
with the costs of self-control, the decision maker should plan to maximize
U + V and u + v respectively at the interim and ex post stages.
Before turning to our models of distorted self-perception, note the bench-
mark case with V = 0 when the decision maker does not expect to have any
temptations at the interim stage. In this case, she obeys strategic rationality
so that for all A;B 2 M0
A º B ) A » A [ B:
Note that she may still anticipate costly temptations at the ex post stage, as
she may exhibit a preference for commitment fag Â fa [ bg for some menus
a;b 2 M1.
3 Self-Deception
We model self-deception as an interim temptation in GP's setup. It should
be noted, however, that self-deception and temptation are di®erent phenom-
ena in general (Szabados [27]). Knowledge of a craving is typical in cases of
temptation, and indeed is presupposed in the notion of self-control. While
nagging suspicion comes with self-deception, self-deception cannot survive
knowledge of self-deception: the enterprise of self-deception is prompted by
motives that cannot be spelled out without destroying the enterprise itself.
Since GP's model is tailored for overt temptation and as such involves a de-
gree of sophistication and self-awareness, using their model for self-deception
11demands cautious reinterpretation. (An empirical distinction between overt
temptation and self-deception is made in the context of the Rationalizable
Self-Deception axiom below.)
We adopt the following interpretation. In the interim stage, the agent's
desires subconsciously prompt her to reevaluate her ex ante perspective by
constructing rationalizations. She ¯nds her new interim perspective com-
pelling and rational, but she also recollects her ex ante views, which include
a recognition of her tendency to rationalize. Her self-deception survives as
she rationalizes her ex ante views, such as by arguing that \at that time
I was not appreciating the fact that ...". At the same time, however, she
cannot deny that she could be deceiving herself { she experiences nagging
doubts about the motives underlying her reasoning. Consequently, her deci-
sions may put some weight on her ex ante perspective, although this involves
a psychological cost of underweighting her compelling interim reasoning.
Observe that in this story, ex ante sophistication does not destroy the
possibility of interim self-deception because the latter can rationalize the
former. Also, the internal tension underlying interim self-deception gives rise
to features that are analogous to the notion of self-control in GP's model:
self-control means placing weight on the ex ante preference despite current
desires, and in the current context this describes the self-restraint that is
prompted by nagging doubts that accompany self-deception. Finally, observe
that this feature distinguishes the model from one of motivated reasoning.
An agent who follows her motivated reasons need not experience any internal
tension. In this case, there would be a divorce between interim and ex ante
perspectives. Behaviorally, this would be captured in the special case of
Set-Betweenness that GP refer to as No Self-Control, which is ruled out by
Continuity here.7
We introduce two axioms that express the nature of self-deception. The
¯rst expresses the fact that self-deception is directed: it must be motivated
by expected ex post consumption.
Axiom 6 (Motivated Self-Deception). For all a;b 2 M1,
fa [ bg Â fbg ) fag » fa;a [ bg:
7In the current context, this is given by: A º B ) A » A[B or A[B » B: This
suggests that in the interim stage, either the interim and ex ante perspectives coincide (in
which case the agent follows her ex ante perspective without experiencing any cost), or
she follows an interim perspective di®erent from an ex ante one without any regard of the
latter.
12The ranking fa[bg Â fbg suggests that the anticipated ex post choice in
the menu a[b belongs to a rather than to b. Motivated Self-Deception (MSD
for short) states that the agent does not deceive herself into choosing a [ b
over a if the bigger menu does not a®ect her anticipated ex post consumption.
When both menus a and a [ b lead to the same ¯nal choice, they also yield
the same degree of satisfaction of desires. Consequently, there can simply
be no motivation for the agent to deceive herself into choosing a [ b over a.
Self-deception has no strategic value in such cases.
While MSD is a natural requirement for self-deception, it may also be
satis¯ed by models of overt temptation where interim desires are sensitive
to ex post choice. (For instance, see Noor and Ren [24] where the agent
is tempted by guiltless indulgence.) Our second axiom delineates cases of
self-deception that are behaviorally distinct from those of overt temptation.
We illustrate with the following example. An agent can either not drink
x0, drink moderately xm or drink heavily xh. Let a = fxmg, b = fx0;xhg,
and a [ b = fx0;xm;xhg. For instance, the menu a may be obtained at a
formal social event, the menu b at a bar where any drinking is heavy, and
a [ b at a home party. The agent has a normative preference to drink less,
but she cannot resist the temptation to drink heavy at the bar. Then she
would commit to a rather than to b ex ante because the former menu leads
to less drinking ex post, and by Set-Betweenness, she exhibits the ranking
fag º fa [ bg º fbg.
We claim that a temptation to go to the bar rather than stay at home,
fa [ bg Â fa [ b;bg;
should be common in cases of overt temptation, especially when the sophisti-
cation implicit in MSD is present: if the agent's temptation is sensitive to ex
post choice, if she anticipates drinking heavily in the bar and only moderately
at home, and if she is not constrained to maintain the facade of rationality
that is necessary for self-deception, then nothing keeps her from desiring the
bar. The following axiom for self-deception imposes an inability to rational-
ize going to the bar, on the grounds that such rationalizations would expose
the agent's underlying motives:
Axiom 7 (Rationalizable Self-Deception). For all menus a;b 2 M1,
fa [ b;bg º fa [ bg:
13Rationalizable Self-Deception (RSD for short) asserts that the agent never
deceives herself into choosing a menu b rather than the larger menu a [ b
when she deems fa [ bg º fbg ex ante. (Note that if fbg Â fa [ bg, then
fa[b;bg º fa[bg follows from Set-Betweenness.) When a[b o®ers greater
temptation than b, such deception is not motivated to begin with. When, as
in the case of the bar vs home, it o®ers as much temptation as b, then any
rationalization for choosing b would have to overturn the fact that a[b o®ers
strictly more options without more temptation. The axiom rules out such
rationalizations. Intuitively, such rationalizations may be too transparent to
generate the semblance of rationality needed for self-deception.
To see that RSD accommodates intuitive cases of self-deception, consider
the following three possible rationalizations the agent can use to justify going
to the bar.
² Overestimation of propensity for self-control: \If I go to the bar I know
I will be tempted to drink, but I have the will-power to abstain."
² Underestimation of susceptibility to temptation: \I am not even going
to be tempted to drink in the bar".
² Relaxation in normative standards: \I am only going to live once, so I
really should allow myself to enjoy life a little.".
Observe how the ¯rst two rationalizations exploit the fact that the bar
contains the normatively superior alternative x0. Indeed, under the exagger-
ated self-control or underestimated temptation, the bar leads to a norma-
tively better outcome than attending the social event, where some drinking
is unavoidable. The third rationalization leads the agent to view the bar in a
positive light, without necessarily invoking a distorted view of her self-control
ability or susceptibility to temptation.
Each of these rationalizations is consistent with RSD because none of
them can help the agent justify going to the bar over staying home. This is
immediately evident (given that the bar o®ers only a subset of the options
available at home) except perhaps in the following case: Suppose the agent
tells herself that she has substantial will-power, and that she will choose x0 in
the bar but xm at home. This would seem to make the bar look normatively
better in terms of ¯nal consumption. However, if xm is optimally chosen when
heavy drinking is possible then it must be better (perhaps after accounting
14for self-control costs) than choosing x0 when heavy drinking is possible. But
the latter describes precisely what she expects in the bar.
We refrain from claiming that there cannot exist cases of self-deception
that violate RSD. A rationalization for choosing the bar must make the
presence of xm look bad { note that the bar provides commitment relative
to the home by excluding xm. If the agent chooses xm at home, then the
agent may view her ex post choice as her temptation, or she may completely
reverse her normative and temptation perspectives. Whether or not this is
characteristic of agents who delicately try to get past their normative defenses
by appealing to reason, we note that it is readily attributable to an agent
who is overtly consumed by her temptation.
3.1 Representation Result
Say that functions u;v 2 U are independent if for all ®;¯;° 2 R,
®u + ¯v + ° = 0 ) ® = ¯ = ° = 0:
Note that u and v are independent if and only if the functions u;v;u + v
represent three di®erent rankings on X.
Theorem 2. º satis¯es Axioms 1{7 if and only if º has a utility represen-
tation (4){(5) such that for all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·U(a) + ¸max
y2a
v(y); (6)
where · ¸ ¸ > 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
Moreover, º has another representation (4), (5), (6) with parameters
·0;¸0 2 R and functions u0;v0 2 U if and only if ·0 = ·, ¸0 = ¸, u0 = ®u+¯u,
and v0 = ®v + ¯v for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v 2 R.
Here the temptation utility V can be interpreted as a distortion of the
interim normative utility U in the direction of the ex post desires v. This
distortion takes the form










if · > ¸, or
V (a) = ·max
x2a
(u(x) + v(x)) (8)
15if · = ¸. To interpret, compare (7) with (5) to see that interim desires V






The perspective underlying u¤ distorts u in the direction of the temptation
utility v. It is as if the agent is tempted to believe that her ex ante normative
perspective u was too stoic, and thus to relax her normative standards and
adopt u¤. The case (8) is a limiting case of (7) where the agent views u + v
as her normative perspective and turns a blind eye to any possibility of
temptation. It is as if by adjusting her normative perspective she believes
that she is resolving all internal con°ict. Observe that in either case, since
· ¸ ¸ > 0, it can never be that the distorted normative preference puts
too much weight on the temptation preference. This is strongly reminiscent
of the fact that self-deception requires the agent to maintain a facade of
rationality. This constrains her from adopting rationalizations that reveal
their underlying motives too clearly.
Observe that interim choice maximizes
U(a) + V (a) = (1 + ·)U(a) + ¸max
y2a
v(y)










which has a similar interpretation to (7). Thus, after engaging in rational-
izations ((7) or (8)) and placing some weight on her ex ante perspective, the
agent's interim behavior correctly recognizes her ex post desires, but distorts
her normative perspective. Note that the interim commitment ranking is
represented by the function 1+·
1+·¡¸u + ¸
1+·¡¸v that assigns the weight of at
least 2
3 to the ex ante commitment utility u. This is an expression not only
of the fact that the agent's rationalizations place weight on u, but also that
interim choice places some weight on the ex ante perspective.
A notable observation is that the agent's anticipated ex post choice is pre-
served at the interim stage, as it maximizes the function 1+·
1+·¡¸u+ ¸
1+·¡¸v+v
that is ordinally equivalent to u+v. Indeed, the interim temptation perspec-
tive under both (7) and (8) leaves anticipated choice undistorted. We learn,
therefore, that while (7) and (8) accommodate a distortion in normative per-
spective and possible blindness to temptation, they cannot accommodate a
distortion in anticipated self-control ability. Evidently, of the three rational-
izations our axiom is consistent with, the third must always hold and the
16second may hold simultaneously, but the ¯rst can never hold. Moreover,
anticipated choice is never distorted by any rationalization she adopts.
These conclusions are not tied to the functional form, but rather express
themselves in behavior. The statement that our self-deceived agent is neces-
sarily tempted to change her normative perspective is captured in the fact
that there must exist singleton menus a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa;bg.
Since the evaluation of singletons does not involve any (non-trivial) evalu-
ation of ex post choice, this expresses an interim con°ict surrounding only
what should be consumed ex post. The statement that our self-deceived
agent is not tempted to misperceive ex post choice (and thus self-control
ability) is re°ected in the following behavior:8
fag Â fa [ bg =) fa;bg » fa;a [ bg: (9)
That is, if b contains tempting alternatives, then there is never a situation
where the temptation by a[b di®ers from the temptation by b. A di®erence
would arise if, for instance, the agent's actual anticipated choice from a [ b
was in b (ex ante anticipated lack of self-control) but she was tempted to
misperceived her choice from a[b to lie in a (temptation-anticipated exertion
of self-control). In such a case the agent would be tempted to view a[b more
favorably than b, and consequently, fa;bg Â fa;a [ bg.
On an intuitive level, MSD and RSD are consistent with rationalizations
that distort anticipated choice. However, such rationalizations are ruled out
when these axioms are adopted in conjunction with other axioms, particularly
Independence.
4 Multiple Self-Deceptions
Our self-deception model rules out the possibility of a virtuous distortion in
her perceived ability to exert self-control. We present here an extension that
accommodates such virtuous distortion of self-perception without departing
8To show this claim, take any a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa[bg. Then V (a[b) ¸ V (b)
because U(a [ b) ¸ U(b) and maxy2a[b v(y) = maxy2b v(y). Consider two cases.
(i) fag » fa;a [ bg Â fa [ bg. Then V (a) ¸ V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) and hence, fag » fa;bg.
(ii) fag Â fa;a [ bg. By MSD, fa [ bg » fbg, that is, U(a [ b) = U(b). By (6),
V (a [ b) = V (b). Thus, fa;bg » fa;a [ bg.
17from the GP framework. Although the general model will not be compatible
with an interpretation involving sophisticated desires with a single motive, it
helps identify some intuitive behaviors ruled out by the model in the previous
section and lends itself to discussion of welfare.
In the self-deception model, temptation by b is motivated by the choice
that the agents expects to make in b. The following axiom accommodates
temptations that are motivated also by the normative content in b.
Axiom 8 (Weak Motivated Self-Deception). For any a;b 2 M1 such
that fa[bg Â fbg and fag Â fa;a[bg, there is z 2 b such that ffzgg Â ffxgg
for all x 2 a.
This condition (WMSD for short) relaxes MSD and allows the menu a[b
to tempt a when the anticipated ex post choices in both menus are the same,
but the menu a[b provides a more virtuous interim self-perception. Formally,
the rankings fa[bg Â fbg and fag Â fa;a[bg are allowed only if a[b has
an element z that is normatively better than any alternative in a. It is as if
the agent has an exaggerated view of her propensity for self-control, that is,
an excessively virtuous self-image.
A departure from a temptation-driven self-deception is evident here: in-
terim temptation is no longer intimately connected with a desire to achieve
ex post satisfaction of desires. An excessively virtuous self-image may lead
the agent to temptation only by accident, and in some situations may even
defeat e®orts at ex post desire satisfaction. It follows that the tendency
toward a virtuous self-perception satis¯es a di®erent desire { presumably a
direct desire for a positive self-image { that is distinct from ex post tempta-
tion. We thus interpret the axiom as adding a second kind of self-deception,
one involved in positive illusions. However, due to the abstract nature of our
framework, we cannot strictly speaking justify this interpretation relative to,
say, wishful thinking.
On the other hand, RSD remains intuitive even if the agent's interim
self-deception has virtuous rationalization and motivation.
Theorem 3. º satis¯es Axioms 1{6 and WMSD if and only if º has a
utility representation (4){(5) such that for all a 2 M1,





where · ¸ ¸ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
18Moreover, º has another representation (4), (5), (6) with parameters
·0;¸0;¹0 2 R and functions u0;v0 2 U if and only if ·0 = ·, ¸0 = ¸, ¹ = ¹0,
u0 = ®u + ¯u, and v0 = ®v + ¯v for some ® > 0 and ¯u;¯v 2 R.
The di®erence between (10) and (6) is the additional term ¹maxz2a u(z)
in the interim temptation utility V . Although the model o®ers up to three
rationalizations for choosing a given menu (namely, distorted normative pref-
erence, distorted temptation preference and perceived virtuosity), the ratio-
nalizations may be inconsistent. For instance, if the menu contains irresistible
temptation, then one rationalization will recognize this and justify it accord-
ing to a more relaxed normative perspective, while the other will refuse to
recognize it.9 The rationalizations may also neutralize each other, such as
when a is more virtuous than b and b contains greater temptation. These are
re°ections of the fact noted above that the model is not one of temptation-
driven self-deception. Such self-deception would presumably involve a search
for the strongest possible case for making a `bad' decision, and such a case
would be as devoid of inconsistencies as possible. Nevertheless, as a model
of an agent who engages in rationalizations more broadly, it permits some
substantive discussion of welfare, to which we now turn.
The implication (9) of the pure self-deception model does not hold in
general. Formally, write a º0 b if there exists z 2 a such that ffzgg º ffxgg
for all x 2 b. Then the preference º represented by (10) satis¯es10
fag Â fa [ bg and a º0 b ) fa;bg º fa;a [ bg:
This condition implies that if b is a `vice' menu and a is a `virtuous' menu,
then the agent is generally better o® if virtue and vice are kept separate
(as in fa;bg) rather than combined (as in fa;a [ bg). The intuition is that
9Behaviorally, suppose ffxgg Â ffx;ygg » ffygg. Then fx;yg may be more tempting
than both fxg and fyg. That is, ffxg;fygg Â ffxg;fyg;fx;ygg. Since one rationalization
favors fxg and the other favors fyg, the fact that fx;yg is more tempting than either
implies the simultaneous use of both rationalizations.
10To show this claim, take any a;b 2 M1 such that fag Â fa [ bg and maxz2a u(z) ¸
maxz2b u(z). Then V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) because U(a [ b) ¸ U(b) and maxy2a[b v(y) =
maxy2b v(y). Consider two cases.
(i) fag » fa;a [ bg. Then V (a) ¸ V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) and hence, fag » fa;bg.
(ii) fag Â fa;a [ bg. By WMSD, fa [ bg » fbg, that is, U(a [ b) = U(b). Therefore,
V (a [ b) ¸ V (b) implies fa;bg º fa;a [ bg.
19the union a [ b lends itself to more excuses for the agent to lead herself
into temptation. Indeed, in this case, given whatever rationalizations the
agent may adopt to justify choosing b from fa;bg, virtuous self-perception
is an additional rationalization that can be invoked to justify choosing a [
b from fa;a [ bg. The behavioral implication suggests, for instance, that
a procrastinor is better-o® if a completely °exible option is not a feasible
choice: if a is the option of completing the task sooner and b is the option of
completing it later, then having the opportunity to make this decision later
(as in fa;a [ bg) makes her worse-o® relative to a situation where she has
to decide today whether to complete the task sooner or later (as in fa;bg).
For another example, view a menu as a physical location selling particular
alternatives and a menu of menus as a town. Then agents in a town are
better-o® if virtue and vice are sold at distinct locations (as in fa;bg) relative
to when vice is always bundled with virtue (as in fa;a[bg). Zoning laws for
casinos may be welfare improving in this sense.
A common view is that optimal welfare policy for agents with self-control
problems constitutes the provision of commitment opportunities. In the
above setting, this would correspond to providing the agent with fa;a [ bg,
in which she may keep all her options by selecting a [ b or avoid tempta-
tion by choosing the commitment option a. The above discussion suggests
that when agents are subject to self-deception, then the simple provision of
commitment opportunities may not always be optimal.
5 Comparative Self-Deception
To interpret the parameters ·, ¸, and ¹ in terms of choice behavior, consider
a pair of preferences º and º¤ over M0. Call this pair regular if both º and
º¤ satisfy Axioms 1{5 and BSD, and the two rankings agree on the domain
of singleton menus so that
fag º fbg , fag º
¤ fbg
for all a;b 2 M1.
By Theorem 3, any regular pair of preferences º and º¤ can be rep-
resented by (4)-(6) with components (u;v;·;¸;¹) and (u¤;v¤;·¤;¸¤;¹¤) re-
spectively. Moreover, the functions U and U¤ represent the same preference
on M1 and hence, by GP's Theorem, one can take u = u¤ and v = v¤.
20Say that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º if for all menus a;b 2 M1,
fag Â fa;bg ) fag Â
¤ fa;bg; (11)
This de¯nition requires that any self-deception that is tempting for º should
be tempting for º¤ as well.
Theorem 4. Let º and º¤ be a regular pair of preferences. Then º¤ is more
self-deceptive than º if and only if the two preferences have representations







This result suggests that the ratios ¸
· and
¹
· are both positively related to











·.) If · > ¸, then the weight ¸
·¡¸ that is put on the function v
in (7) is a positive monotonic transformation of ¸
· and hence, can serve as an





¸ is necessary for an unambiguous compari-
son of self-deception revealed by the two rankings º and º¤. This equality
requires roughly that the proportion of the virtuous and motivated compo-
nents of self-deception should be the same for º and º¤. In particular, this
must be true when both º and º¤ satisfy MSD and hence, ¹ = ¹¤ = 0.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the behavioral foundations for self-deception. It seeks
to behaviorally capture the phenomenon as described in the Introduction,
but also to distinguish it from overt temptation and motivated reasoning.
Achieving the distinction requires us to adopt a rich choice domain. For in-
stance, while self-deception may well take place in the ex post stage (choice
from menus), it may not be distinguishable from overt temptation: an agent
may ¯nd reasons to drink heavily while in a bar, but her behavior would
be identical to that of some overtly tempted agent. Thus we are led to fo-
cus on self-deception prior to the time of ¯nal consumption, that is, in the
agent's interim choice of bars while in a neighborhood. However, in order
to identify self-deception at this stage and to distinguish it from motivated
reasoning, the choice data we require is the agent's choice of neighborhoods.
Thus, avoiding neighborhoods with particular bars { a preference for com-
mitment { reveals the agent's concern with her capacity for self-deception.
21The distinction between self-deception and motivated reasoning (namely, the
existence of tension) comes down to that between the Set-Betweenness and
No Self-Control axioms.
Rationalizations are germane to self-deception, but instead of taking these
unobservables as part of our primitives, we derive them from choice behavior.
On an intuitive level, we expect that the overly virtuous self-image inherent
in the rationalization \I have the will-power to stop myself.." is an important
strategic tool for desires to induce the agent to make decisions that will lead
her into temptation. Yet, while such rationalizations are consistent with key
behavioral properties of self-deception (the MSD and RSD axioms) on an
intuitive level, they are ruled out in a GP-style model of self-deception (in
particular, one that imposes Independence). A direction for future research is
to provide a model of temptation-driven self-deception that can accommodate
the strategic use of virtuous self-perceptions.
A APPENDIX: PROOFS
In the proofs, we use the following notation and terminology. For any func-





T (u) = f®u + ¯ : ® ¸ 0;¯ 2 Rg
be the set of all non-negative transformations of the function u.
For any S 2 N, let S denote also the set f1;:::;Sg. Kopylov [16, Lemma
A.1] shows that for any u1;:::;uS 2 U, there are elements x1;:::;xS 2 X
such that for all i;j 2 S, and
ui = 2 T (uj) , ui(xi) > ui(xj): (12)
This equivalence implies that ui(xi) ¸ ui(xj) for all i;j 2 S.
Turn to Theorem 1. The necessity of Axioms 1{4 for representation (1) is
straightforward. Conversely, suppose that º satis¯es Axioms 1{4. Kopylov






(v(y) ¡ v(x)) ¡ max
b2A
(V (b) ¡ V (a))
¸
22for some u;v 2 U and V 2 U1. Moreover, if º satis¯es Regularity, then
the triple (u;v;V ) in this representation is unique up to a positive linear












U(a) = w(a) ¡ v(a) (14)
for all A 2 M0 and a 2 M1.
Turn to Theorems 2 and 3. Suppose that º satis¯es Axioms 1{6 and
WMSD. By Theorem 1, º is represented by (13). By Regularity, there are






Then w(x¤) > w(y¤) and v(y¤) > v(x¤), and hence, w and v are not redun-




¤) = V (fx
¤g) = 0: (15)
The following two lemmas obtain the required form for V .
Lemma 5. There are ·;½;¹ 2 R such that for all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·w(a) + ½v(a) + ¹u(a): (16)
Proof. We claim ¯rst that for all a;b 2 M1,
w(a) = w(b); v(a) = v(b); u(a) = u(b) ) V (a) = V (b): (17)
Show this claim by contradiction. Consider any a;b 2 M1 such that w(a) =
w(b), v(a) = v(b), u(a) = u(b), but V (b) > V (a). By (14), U(a) = U(b) and
hence, W(b) > W(a). As W is continuous, then there is " > 0 such that
W("fy
¤g + (1 ¡ ")b) > W("fx
¤g + (1 ¡ ")a):
Let a¤ = "fx¤g + (1 ¡ ")a and b¤ = "fy¤g + (1 ¡ ")b. As w(x¤) > w(y¤),
v(y¤) > v(x¤), and u(x¤) > u(y¤), then by linearity, w(a¤) = w(a¤ [ b¤) >






As W(b¤) > W(a¤), then there are two possible cases.











² W(a¤ [ b¤) > W(a¤). Then V (a¤ [ b¤) > V (a¤). By (13), fa¤g Â
fa¤;a¤ [ b¤g, which contradicts WMSD because u(a¤) > u(b¤).
This contradiction shows (17).
Take any four menus a1;a2;a3;a4 2 M1. Let a = [4
i=1ai. There is i
such that w(a) ¸ w(ai), v(a) ¸ v(ai), and u(a) ¸ u(ai). Let b = [j6=iaj.
Then w(a) = w(b), v(a) = v(b), and u(a) = u(b). By (17), V (a) = V (b).
Kopylov [15, Theorem 2.1] implies that the ranking that V represents on M1






such that S · 3, °1;:::;°S 2 f¡1;1g, and ui 62 T (uj) for all i;j 2 S such
that i 6= j. As both V 0 and V are linear, then without loss in generality,
V 0 = V .
We claim that for all i 2 f1;:::;Sg,
ui 2 T (w) [ T (v) [ T (u): (19)
Wlog let i = 1, and suppose that u1 = 2 T (w)[T (v)[T (u): Take x1;:::;xS+3
that satisfy (12), that is,
u1(x1) > u1(xj) for all j 6= 1
ui(xi) ¸ ui(xj) for all i > 1 and j 6= i
w(xS+1) ¸ w(xj) for all j 6= S + 1
v(xS+2) ¸ v(xj) for all j 6= S + 2
u(xS+3) ¸ u(xj) for all j 6= S + 3:
Let a = fx1;:::;xS+3g and b = fx2;:::;xS+3g. Then u1(a) = u1(x1) >
u1(b), but w(a) = w(b), v(a) = v(b), u(a) = u(b), and uj(a) = uj(b) for all
j 6= 1. Thus,
V (b) ¡ V (a) = V
0(b) ¡ V
0(a) = °i(ui(xi) ¡ ui(a)) 6= 0;
which contradicts (17).
The claims (18) and (19) and the normalization (15) imply (16).
24The previous lemma implies that
W(a) = U(a) + V (a) = (· + 1)w(a) + (½ ¡ 1)v(a) + ¹u(a)
= (· + 1)U(a) + (· + ½)v(a) + ¹u(a)
(20)
for all menus a 2 M1.
Lemma 6. The functions u;v are independent. The parameters ·;½;¹ are
unique and satisfy ½ · 0, · + ½ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0. If º satis¯es MSD, then ¹ = 0.
Proof. Let a = fx¤g and b = fy¤g. By (14), fag Â fa [ bg Â fbg. By
WMSD, V (a) ¸ V (a [ b). By (16),







Thus, ½ · 0. To prove the other claims of the lemma, consider two cases.
Case 1. w, v, u are redundant. Then u must be a positive linear trans-
formation of w or v. If u = ®v for some ® > 0, then w = u + v and v are
redundant. Thus, u = ®w for some ® > 0. Then v = (® ¡ 1)w. As w and v
are not redundant, then ® 2 (0;1). For all a 2 M1,
V (a) = ·w(a) + ½v(a) + ¹u(a) = (·
0 + ½)U(a) + ½v(a);
W(a) = (·
0 + 1)U(a) + (·
0 + ½)v(a);


















Let a = fx¤;y¤g and b = f®y¤ + (1 ¡ ®)x¤;¯x¤ + (1 ¡ ¯)y¤g. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x
¤) ¡ w(®y




v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y
¤) ¡ v(¯x




By (21) and (20),










W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (·




25Therefore, fa[bg Â fbg, but fb;a[bg » fbg, which contradicts RSD. Thus,
·0 + ½ ¸ 0. Thus, for all x 2 X,
V (fxg) = (·
0 + ½)U(fxg) + ½®¡1
® u(x) = °U(fxg);
where ° = (·0 + ½) + ½®¡1
® is positive. By (13) and (14), for all x;y 2 X,
ffxgg º ffygg ) ffxgg » ffxg;fygg º ffygg;
which violates Regularity.
Case 2. w, v, u are not redundant. Then u and v are independent, and
there are x;y;z 2 X such that
w(x) > w(y) _ w(z)
v(y) > v(x) _ v(z)
u(z) > u(x) _ u(y):
Suppose that ¹ < 0. Take ® 2 (0;1) such that
®(· + 1)(w(x) ¡ w(y)) + ¹(u(z) ¡ u(x)) < 0:
Let a = fx;y;zg and b = fy;®y + (1 ¡ ®)xg. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x) ¡ w(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) > 0
v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y) ¡ v(y) = 0
u(a [ b) ¡ u(b) = u(z) ¡ u(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) ¸ u(z) ¡ u(x) > 0:
By (14), U(a [ b) ¡ U(b) = w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) > 0: By (20),
W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (· + 1)(w(a [ b) ¡ w(b)) + ¹(u(a [ b) ¡ u(b)) ·
®(· + 1)(w(x) ¡ w(y)) + ¹(u(z) ¡ u(x)) < 0:
Therefore, fa [ bg Â fbg and fb;a [ bg » fbg. These rankings violate RSD.
Thus, ¹ ¸ 0.


















26Let a = fx;y;zg and b = f®y + (1 ¡ ®)x;¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y;zg. Then
w(a [ b) ¡ w(b) = w(x) ¡ w(®y + (1 ¡ ®)x) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) > 0
v(a [ b) ¡ v(b) = v(y) ¡ v(¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y) = ¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) > 0
u(a [ b) ¡ u(b) = u(z) ¡ u(z) = 0:
By (22) and (20),
U(a [ b) ¡ U(b) = ®(w(x) ¡ w(y)) ¡ ¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) > 0
j(· + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b))j < j· + ½j¯(v(y) ¡ v(x))
W(a [ b) ¡ W(b) = (· + 1)(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b)) + (· + ½)¯(v(y) ¡ v(x)) < 0:
Therefore, fa[bg Â fbg, but fb;a[bg » fbg, which contradicts RSD. Thus,
· + ½ ¸ 0.




0) = (· + ¹)U(fx
0g);
where · + ¹ = ¡½ + ¹ ¸ 0. This equality contradicts Regularity (see the
proof of Case 1.) Thus, · + ½ > 0.
Suppose that º satis¯es MSD. Let a = fx;yg and b = fy;zg. Then
fa [ bg Â fbg. By MSD,
V (a) ¡ V (a [ b) = ¹(u(x) ¡ u(z)) ¸ 0:
Thus, ¹ = 0.
Finally, note that
· =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (f®z + (1 ¡ ®)x;y;zg)
®(w(x) ¡ w(z))
½ =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (fx;®x + (1 ¡ ®)y;zg)
®(v(y) ¡ v(x))
¹ =
V (fx;y;zg ¡ V (fx;y;®x + (1 ¡ ®)zg)
®(u(z) ¡ u(x))
for all su±ciently small ®. These equations show that all of these parameters
are unique.
27Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that V has the required form
V (a) = ·U(a) + ¸v(a) + ¹u(a) = ·w(a) + (¸ ¡ ·)v(a) + ¹u(a); (23)
where · ¸ ¸ = · + ½ > 0, ¹ ¸ 0, and u;v 2 U are independent.
Conversely, suppose that º has representation (13), (14), and (23). Take
any a;b 2 M1 such that fa [ bg Â fbg. By (23),
V (a [ b) ¡ V (b) = ·(U(a [ b) ¡ U(b)) + ¸(v(a [ b) ¡ v(b))+
¹(u(a [ b) ¡ u(b)) ¸ 0
because U(a [ b) > U(b), v(a [ b) ¸ v(b), and u(a [ b) ¸ u(b). By (13),
fa [ bg » fb;a [ bg Â fbg;
and º satis¯es RSD. (If fbg º fa[bg, then fb;a[bg º fa[bg follows from
Set-Betweenness.)
Moreover,
V (a) ¡ V (a [ b) = ·(w(a) ¡ w(a [ b)) + (¸ ¡ ·)(v(a) ¡ v(a [ b))+
¹(u(a) ¡ u(a [ b)) ¸ ¹(u(a) ¡ u(a [ b))
because w(a) = w(a [ b), v(a [ b) ¸ v(a), and ¸ ¡ · · 0. Therefore, the
ranking fag Â fa;a[bg implies that ¹ > 0 and u(b) > u(a). Thus º satis¯es
WMSD, and if ¹ = 0, then º satis¯es MSD.
As u and v are independent, then w and v are not redundant. Take
x;y 2 X such that w(x) > w(y) and v(y) > v(x). By (14),
ffxgg Â ffx;ygg Â ffygg:
Let v0 = (· + ¹)u + ¸v and w0 = u + v0. As u and v are independent and
¸ > 0, then the functions w0 and v0 are not redundant. Take x0;y0 2 X such






Thus, º satis¯es Regularity.
Turn to Theorem 4. Suppose that º and º¤ have representations (4)-(6)
with components (u;v;·;¸;¹) and (u;v;·¤;¸¤;¹¤) such that · ¸ ¸ > 0,







¸. Then U = U¤ and for all a;b 2 M1,
fag Â fa;bg ) U(a) > U(b) and V (b) > V (a) )
[U(b) ¡ U(a)] + ¸



















¤(a) ) fag Â
¤ fa;bg:
Thus, º¤ is more self-deceptive than º.
Conversely, suppose that º¤ is more self-deceptive than º. As u and v
are independent, then the functions u, v, and w = u + v are not redundant.
By (12), there are x;y;z 2 X such that
w(x) > w(y) _ w(z)
v(y) > v(x) _ v(z)
u(z) > u(x) _ u(y):
As w;v;u 2 U, then for any ®;° > 0, there exist x0;y0;z0 2 X such that
w(x) > w(x
0) > w(y) _ w(y
0) _ w(z) _ w(z
0)
v(y) > v(y
0) > v(x) _ v(x
0) _ v(z) _ v(z
0)
u(z) > u(z
0) > u(x) _ u(x





















¸. Take ° such that
¹¤
¸¤ > ° >
¹
¸ and ® such that 1 >
® > 1 ¡
°¸¡¹
°· : Take x0;y0;z0 2 X that satisfy (24). Let a = fx0;y0;zg and
b = fx;y;z0g. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) ¡ (w(x) ¡ v(y)) = (1 ¡ ®)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V (b) ¡ V (a) =
³



















¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸ ¡
¹
° > 0 > ¡·




Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption





¸. Take ° such that
¹¤
¸¤ < ° <
¹
¸ and ® such that 1 <
® < 1 +
¹¡°¸
°· : Take x0;y0;z0 2 X that satisfy (24). Let a = fx;y;z0g and
b = fx0;y0;zg. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x) ¡ v(y)) ¡ (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) = (® ¡ 1)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0
V (b) ¡ V (a) =
³



















¡·(® ¡ 1) ¡ ¸ +
¹
° > 0 > ¡·




Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption







·. Take ® such that 1 ¡ ¸¤
·¤ > ® > 1 ¡ ¸
·: Take
x0;y0 2 X that satisfy (24). (z0 is not required here.) Let a = fx0;y0;zg and
b = fx;y;zg. Then
U(a) ¡ U(b) = (w(x
0) ¡ v(y
0)) ¡ (w(x) ¡ v(y)) = (1 ¡ ®)(v(y) ¡ v(y
0)) > 0









¡·(1 ¡ ®) + ¸ > 0 > ¡·
¤(1 ¡ ®) + ¸
¤:
Thus, fag Â fa;bg, but fag »¤ fa;bg, which contradicts the assumption
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